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DAN D. CRAWFORD 
INTELLECT AND WILL IN AUGUSTINE'S 
CONFESSIONS* 
Augustine tells us in the Confessions that his reading of Cicero's Hortensius at 
the age of nineteen aroused in him a burning 
' 
passion for the wisdom of 
eternal truth'. He was inspired 'to love wisdom itself, whatever it might be, 
and to search for it, pursue it, hold it, and embrace it firmly'.1 And thus he 
embarked on his arduous journey to the truth, which was at the same time 
a conversion to Catholic Christianity, and which culminated twelve years 
later in his experience in the garden in Milan. 
In the first part of this paper I will trace Augustine's search for intellectual 
knowledge and truth 
- 
the pathway from Manicheeism to Catholicism by 
which he achieves what he takes to be a true conception of God. Consider? 
ation will be given to the way in which his intellectual progress affects and 
is affected by the conative side of his nature 
- his desires, habits and affec? 
tions. I will then ask whether the insight into God's nature that Augustine 
achieves suffices to give him the wisdom that he seeks, and will consider his 
novel suggestion that it does not. We will see that Augustine attempts to set 
out additional, non-intellectual criteria for attaining knowledge of God 
- 
where 'knowledge' has a richer sense that involves 'holding' the truth, and 
'embracing it fully'. Augustine's conversion to the truth essentially involves 
a reorienting of the will, a radical change in attitude and motive. 
My second concern is with Augustine's conception of how his own will 
functions in his conversion. Clearly he thinks of his conversion as a. process of 
change within the whole self, but one that culminates in a final act of will. 
His highly dramatized and metaphorical description of the struggle that goes 
on within him leading to his final decision is a repository of insight into 
human willing. I will attempt to elicit from the text of the Confessions 
Augustine's conception of the will 
- 
whether it functions as liberum arbitrium, 
capable of choosing between presented alternatives, or simply as the execu? 
tive organ of reason or desire. Secondly, I will consider the extent to which 
Augustine views himself as contributing by his own initiative both to the 
* I wish to thank John Hare, William King, William Alston, Newton Perrin, Peter Moore, and 
Ludwig Schlecht, each of whom read or heard earlier drafts of this paper and made significant criticisms. 1 I am relying on the translation of the Confessions by R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin, 1961), and 
I will adopt his division of the work into books and chapters. The passage cited is from Book in, chapter 
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overall process of conversion and to the final moment of decision. Consider? 
ation of Augustine's participation in the process must take into account 
his explicit recognition that he is in St Paul's predicament of not being able 
to do what he wants to do. The relevant questions are : What does Augustine 
do to bring about his conversion ? and Is his final decision something that he 
accomplishes by his own effort and striving? 
I should acknowledge at the outset of this discussion that this study is 
based almost exclusively on the text of the Confessions. However, as I will 
indicate, my reading of Augustine on the will and its activity coheres with 
that other related work on the will, De Libero Arbitrio, written at approxi? 
mately the same time as the Confessions. 
Knowing and Holding God 
In Books III and IV of the Confessions, Augustine confesses some of the 
intellectual and moral failings that stood as obstacles in the way of his finding 
the truth. To begin with, he was led astray by the theological errors and 
misconceptions of the Manichees. Their fundamental mistake was that they 
viewed God as a quasi-material reality. Under the influence of these 
'sensualists', Augustine conceived God as 
a great being with dimensions extending everywhere, throughout infinite space, 
permeating the whole mass of the world and reaching in all directions beyond it 
without limit, so that the earth and the sky and all creation were full of you and their 
limits were within you, while you had no limits at all.1 
Similarly, he was unable to conceive of the human mind 'except as a rarefied 
body somehow diffused in space'.2 
For my mind ranged in imagination over shapes and forms such as are familiar to 
the eye, and I did not realize that the power of thought, by which I formed these 
images, 
was itself something quite different from them.3 
And further, he adhered to the false doctrine that God and man (in his good 
part) were beings that had a common nature. 'I thought that you... were a 
bright unbounded body and I a small piece broken from it'.4 
From his later vantage point of Catholic belief, Augustine sees that al? 
though he had always correctly believed that God is, and is omnipresent, he 
was fundamentally mistaken about what God is,5 and the manner in which 
all things are in him. He comes to see in retrospect that the Manicheean God 
he embraced was a 'phantom' lacking in reality and substance. 
I gulped down this food, because I thought that it was you. I had no relish for it, 
because the taste it left in my mouth was not the taste of truth 
- 
it could not be, for 
it was not you but an empty sham.6 
vu, i, p. 134. 3 
vu, 1, p. 134. 
5 
vi, 5, p. 117. 
2 
v, 10, p. 105. 
4 
iv, 16, p. 89. 6 
m, 6, p. 61. 
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We will see that Augustine does not escape from these false ideas about God 
and the self until, much later, he encounters the writings of the Platonists, 
and through them turns inward to discover his own nature and the source 
of his being. 
Augustine was also prevented from finding the truth by his own moral 
vices, that is, by certain desires and attitudes which in retrospect he came to 
view as manifestations of a corrupt will. Thus his ambition to be successful 
in the fields of law and public speaking was motivated by vanity and conceit. 
And he speaks of a pervasive attitude of pride and self-esteem that sur? 
rounded all of his achievements. 
The main defect in the will was that he loved material goods and objects 
of beauty rather than the source and creator of all good and beautiful things. 
But just as the Manicheean doctrines did not have the 'taste of truth', so 
these finite goods were not wholly satisfying. Augustine shows how his love 
for material things always produced in him some measure of pain and 
suffering. As contingent and impermanent, they could not give lasting 
happiness. This was brought home to him in a most convincing manner by 
the deep and prolonged agony he felt at the death of a boyhood companion. 
Augustine diagnoses his grief as the result of improper willing: 
' 
I had poured 
out my soul upon him, like water upon sand, loving a man who was mortal 
as though he were never to die'.1 
We may note in the explanation Augustine gives of his suffering an 
important link between his dislocated will and his intellectual errors. The 
death of his friend had left him in a state of bewilderment and abject misery. 
He confesses that he should have placed his heavy load of misery upon God, 
but could not because he did not think of God 'as anything real and 
substantial'. 'The God I worshipped was my own delusion, and if I tried to 
find in it a place to rest my burden, there was nothing there to uphold it. It 
only fell and weighed me down once more_'2 The point seems to be that 
Augustine could not hope to turn away from finite objects as long as his idea 
of God was fundamentally mistaken. His search for happiness and a place to 
rest his burdens depended in this way upon his having a true understanding 
of God. 
But if right willing is thus dependent on adequate knowledge, there is a 
dependency in the other direction as well, for Augustine's false idea of God 
was grounded in his corrupt will. First, it was engendered by pride, for 'what 
greater pride could there be than to assert, as I did in my strange madness, 
that by nature I was what you are '?3 More generally, it was born of his 
tendency to think and move among material forms and goods. 'My con? 
ception of you was quite untrue, a mere falsehood. It was a fiction based on 
my own wretched state, not the firm foundation of your bliss'.4 So it seems 
iv, 8, p. 79. 
iv, 15, p. 86. 
iv, 7, p. 78. 4 
iv, 16, p. 88. 
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true also that Augustine's pride and desire for material goods stand in the 
way of his forming a correct idea of God. His struggle to attain wisdom, then, 
will be occurring on two fronts at once. 
Augustine describes himself as held captive by his sensuous habits and 
attitudes and powerless to change them, until the very final episode in the 
garden. Hence in the early stages, he makes no attempt to alter his desires, 
but rather devotes himself to a critical examination of his beliefs. It turns out 
that the same philosophical, questioning temper of mind that had caused 
him to abandon his early Christian persuasion in favour of the more sophis? 
ticated Manicheean doctrines, eventually leads him back to those original 
beliefs. Interestingly, what causes him to doubt the authority of Manes was 
that his sacred writings contained scientific errors. Augustine relies on the 
accurate predictions of the astronomers to call into question the physical 
theories of the Manichees. He finds the theories of the scientists 'more likely 
to be true'.1 Even if these matters concerning 'the sky and the stars and the 
movements of the sun and the moon' are 'no part of religious doctrine', 
nevertheless since Manes claimed that his utterances were those of a divine 
person, the fact that they were shown to be wrong called into question his 
religious authority. 'But as he knew no science and yet had the effrontery to 
try to teach it, he could not possibly have had true wisdom'.2 
The scientists, for their part, could not be trusted as truth-bearers, for they 
do not press far enough in their inquiries, just as Augustine had not in his 
own liberal studies. In their pride, they fail to discern the creator of the stars, 
and even to 
' 
inquire how they come to possess the intelligence to make these 
researches'.3 Scientific knowledge, if it is pursued as an end in itself, is 
wrongly pursued.4 But even if Augustine does thus condemn the astron? 
omers and place a merely conditional value upon their inquiries, it should 
be noted that he had enough confidence in them to use their results to refute 
the Manichees and thus further his own search for truth. 
Disillusioned with Manicheeism, Augustine begins to think that there 
might be wisdom in the teachings of the Academic philosophers who 
' 
as? 
serted that man can know nothing for certain'.5 He has reached a moment 
of intellectual crisis in which all of his beliefs seem doubtful and he despairs 
of ever finding the truth. 
Anxiety about what I could believe as certain gnawed at my heart all the more 
sharply as I grew more and more ashamed that I had been misled and deluded by 
promises of certainty for so long, and had talked wildly, like an ignorant child, about 
so many unconfirmed theories as though they 
were 
beyond question.6 
However, Augustine finds good grounds for rejecting scepticism. He observes 
that we accept many things on authority and without convincing evidence, 
1 
v, 3, P- 93- 
2 
v, 5, pp. 95-6. 3 
v, 3, p. 93. 
4 
v, 3, p. 93. 
5 
v, 10, p. 104. 
6 
vi, 4, p. 115. 
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and that 'unless we took these things on trust, we should accomplish ab? 
solutely nothing in this life'.1 We may interpret him as saying that the 
sceptic's demand that knowledge be indubitable is inconsistent with the 
epistemic standards we employ in our common beliefs and practices. But 
Augustine then uses this valid point against scepticism to draw the illicit 
conclusion that Christians who accept the authority of Scripture on insuf? 
ficient evidence are justified in doing so. 
' 
I ought not to find fault with those 
who believed your Bible,... [and] ought to pay no attention to people who 
asked me how I could be sure that the Scriptures were delivered to mankind 
by the Spirit of the one true God_'2 Is he claiming simply that it would 
be inconsistent on his part to accuse the Christian of holding an irrational 
belief in the authority of Scripture as long as he himself holds many beliefs 
without sufficient evidence? 
Fortunately, Augustine goes beyond this rather innocuous point and 
attempts to give some positive reason for accepting Scripture as authori? 
tative. Since his own rational efforts have not been able to determine the 
truth, he concludes that men need some other avenue to the knowledge of 
God. So, plausibly, God has provided such an avenue in Scripture. Since the 
Bible is accorded a 'conspicuous authority in every land', it is reasonable to 
think that God has 
' 
intended it to be the means by which we should look for 
you and believe in you'.3 This argument from the universality of belief 
limps. But I think we should view this lame attempt to give a positive ground 
as ancillary to his main purpose which is to announce that he is now 
beginning 'to prefer the Catholic teaching',4 and that he is prepared to 
accept Scripture on faith and without proof. And Scripture is also more 
palatable now that Ambrose has convinced him that many seemingly absurd 
passages can be interpreted allegorically. But it bears repeating that the 
main thrust of this section (vi, 5) is not to offer rational grounds for belief, 
but to renounce the need for probative grounds. 
Augustine now views Scripture as 
' 
the means by which we should look for 
you and believe in you'.5 And this new commitment reflects a change in the 
will not only because it involves dispositions to act in certain ways, but also 
because Augustine has had to swallow his pride to some extent even to think 
of Scripture as a source of truth. We will see that, at a later stage, this 
acceptance of scripture plays a crucial role as disclosing the 
' 
path 
' 
to the 
knowledge of God 
- which is to adopt the Christ-like attitudes of humility 
and charity. 
Augustine now reaches a point where he makes a breakthrough in 
understanding God's nature. He obtains some 'books of the Platonists' and 
through them is led to an intellectual vision of God and a new appreciation 
1 
vi, 5, p- 117- 
2 
VI>5, P- "7 
3 
vi, 5, p. 117. 
4 
vi, 5, p. 116. 
5 
vi., 5, p. 117. John Hare has reminded me that even Satan accepts the authority of Scripture. Thus 
Augustine's faith in Scripture certainly does not carry him straightaway to the truth. 
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of God's nature and his own. The Platonists teach him to look within himself 
and there to draw back from the confusion of images and consider the power 
of reason itself and the source of its knowledge. 'I entered, and with the eye 
of my soul, such as it was, I saw the Light that never changes casting its rays 
over the same eye of my soul, over my mind '.* It was this light that illumined 
the mind 'when it proclaimed for certain that what was immutable was 
better than that which was not', and by which 'it had come to know the 
immutable itself. Thus Augustine realizes that he has always possessed a 
priori knowledge, and sees the Light that casts its rays over his mind as the 
ground ofthat certainty. 'And so, in an instant of awe, my mind attained to 
the sight of the God who IS'.2 
We will not attempt to evaluate this rational evidence for God that 
incorporates a partial vision of the object. For our purposes, what is import? 
ant is that Augustine gains from it an insight into the divine nature that 
at once dispells error and confusion, and turns aside scepticism. He now 
takes himself to be objectively certain that God is incorporeal, eternal 
wisdom, being, and the source of all being. And he claims to have gained 
knowledge of these truths not through the authority of revelation but through 
the power of reason. 
We find in this episode of Augustine's conversion the highest degree of 
what Peter Brown calls the 'spiritual autonomy' of the Platonist tradition. 
Brown points out that 
' 
the Platonists had always felt able to offer a vision of 
God that a man might gain for himself, by himself, through the unaided, 
rational "ascent" of his mind to the realm of ideas'.3 And yet in spite of this 
common ground with the Platonists, we realize that Augustine is not going 
all the way with them when, in reflecting on his new insight, he states : 
When first I knew you, you raised me up so that I could see that there was something 
to be seen, but also that I was not yet able to see it_Your light shone upon 
me in 
its brilliance, and I thrilled with love and dread alike. I realized that I was far away 
from you.4 
Augustine has certain knowledge of God but is still distant from him. 'I had 
no doubt at all that you were the one to whom I should cling, only I was not 
yet able to cling to you'.5 'I was too weak to enjoy you'.6 Augustine is 
aware that his intellectual vision of God has not given him the full knowledge 
of the truth that he seeks. The Platonists have raised the curtain, enabling 
him to know and love God, and yet this encounter with God is deficient in 
a way that Augustine can only describe in terms of various metaphors of 
1 
vu, i o, p. 146. 2 
vu, 17, p. 151. 
3 
Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 1969), p. 103. 
4 
vu, 10, p. 147. 
5 
vu, 17, p. 151. 
6 
vu, 20, p. 154. 
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possession (holding, clinging to), intimate acquaintance (finding one's 
home, remaining in, enjoying), and even physical intake: 
In my weakness I recoiled and fell back into my old ways, carrying with me nothing 
but the memory of something that I loved and longed for, as though I had sensed 
the fragrance of the fare but 
was not yet able to eat it.1 
Augustine now focuses on what it is that prevents him from knowing God 
in this intimate and enduring way. The problem lies in the 
' 
old attachments 
' 
within the will. He cannot be steadfast in his love for God as long as he 
continues to submit to his desires for material ends 
- 
honour, wealth, and 
above all, 'woman's love'. 
This acknowledgement of his own pride and resistance in refusing to 
devote himself to the truth gives Augustine the occasion to show just why the 
Platonist philosophers come up short. Like the scientists, they 
are puffed up 
with pride and hold their heads 'high in the clouds of learning'.2 'Although 
they have the knowledge of God, they do not honour him or give thanks to 
him as God'.3 Moreover, their pride is manifest in their failure to recognize 
the causal role of God in their knowledge of him. They do not appreciate the 
teaching of Paul that 'he who sees ought not to boast as though what he sees, 
and even the power by which he sees, had not come to him by gift5.4 The 
Platonists' prescription to turn inward has enabled Augustine to locate the 
truth, but it is by faith in the Catholic teachings that he is shown the path 
to it, viz. the sorts of attitudes and commitments by which he can lay hold 
of it, and bring it into his life and activity.5 He sees that he must exchange 
his attitudes of pride and self-esteem for Christian virtues of humility, piety, 
and charity,6 and replace the old attachments with a life of contemplation 
and chastity. For Augustine, who we must remember is experiencing con? 
version, the path to the truth finally comes down to the matter of deciding 
to adopt a life of humble service.7 
1 
vu, 17, p. 152. 
2 
vu, 9, p. 145. 3 
vu, 9, pp. 145-6 (Romans 1: 21). 
4 
vu, 21, p. 155 (I Cor. 4: 7). 5 
I have benefited from David BurrelPs formulation of this point in 'Augustine: Understanding as a 
Personal Quest'. He emphasizes that Augustine, at one and the same time, wanted to 'acknowledge his 
debt to the neo-Platonists and seek to enlarge the pattern for understanding which they offered to him. 
The inspiration for a new pattern is manifestly Christian 
- the difference between a disembodied word 
and a word made flesh is precisely the increment which discipline adds to insight'. Ch. 1 in Exercises in 
Religious Understanding (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 11 ?41, especially pp. 
22-5. The passage cited is on p. 24. 
6 
vu, 20, p. 154. 'For was I not without charity, which builds its edifice on the firm foundation of 
humility, that is, on Jesus Christ? But how could I expect that the Platonist books would ever teach me 
charity'? 7 
We may well ask why Augustine thinks it is necessary to adopt these specifically Christian attitudes 
in order to lay hold of the truth. The answer, I think, has to do with certain specifically Christian 
theological doctrines that Augustine has accepted. God is viewed as creator 
- 
transcendent and majestic; 
and man, on his side, has separated himself from God by a sinful act. Within this theological framework, 
attitudes of humility and reverence become appropriate for one who seeks to know God. The Platonists 
do not see the need to approach God in this way because they have a fundamentally different conception 
of God and, more importantly, of God's relation to man. 
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The Impotent Will 
Now that Augustine has located the problem of knowing-and-holding God 
within the sphere of the will, he encounters the problem of the will, namely that 
he cannot will wholeheartedly what he most desires. He is precisely in St 
Paul's position of not being able to do what he would do. His problem is that 
he lacks the strength of will to do what he wants to do and knows to be best. 
The will is 'weighed down by habit', and therefore 'does not wholly rise to 
the heights where it is lifted by the truth'.1 
This limitation upon the will is put, strikingly, in terms of two conflicting 
'wills' within him. There is the old will that wills earthly pleasures, and also 
a 'new will which had come to life in me and made me wish to serve you 
freely and enjoy you... [but] was not yet strong enough to overcome the 
old_'21 take Augustine to be saying that these two wills are two conflicting 
(sets of) desires within one will or self. He is not saying that he is split into two 
agents or selves, for that would be to slip back into the Manicheean error. 
He repeatedly affirms that it is the same self that acts (or attempts to act) 
from each of these desires.3 Thus he regards the self as something distinct 
from these wills. 
Moreover, he conceives the self as an agent in that it seeks to influence this 
struggle between his desires. 
' 
In this warfare I was on both sides, but I took 
the part of that which I approved in myself rather than the part of that 
which I disapproved \4 An important change has occurred in Augustine, for 
he is now 'on the side of the new will. Having discovered the path to God, 
he is beginning to act from a second-order desire that his first-order desire 
to devote himself to God should be realized. He seeks to strengthen and 
encourage in himself his desire for a life of service. 'I cudgelled my soul and 
belaboured it with reasons why it should follow me now that I was trying so 
hard to follow you'.5 He is angry with himself over his own indecisiveness.6 
And as he nears the moment of conversion, instead of saying 'not yet', as 
he had in the past,7 he attempts to goad himself into acting: 'In my heart 
I kept saying "Let it be now, let it be now!", and merely by saying this 
I 
was on the point of making the resolution'.8 In this way, Augustine's 
initiative has shifted to a higher level: he admits that he cannot simply 
1 
vin, 9, P- 172. 2/iii, 5, p. 164. 
3 
vin, 5, p. 165; vu, 3, p. 136; and vu, 10, where he states: 'When I was trying to reach a decision 
about serving the Lord my God, as I had long intended to do, it was I who willed to take this course and 
again it was I who willed not to take it. It 
was I and I alone. But I neither willed to do it nor refused to do 
it with my full will. So I was at odds with myself (p. 173). Again, the Manichees should 'cease to deny 
that when a man tries to make a decision, he has one soul which is torn between conflicting wills' 
(p. 174). 
4 
vin, 5, p. 164. 
5 
vm, 7, p. 170. 
6 
'I was frantic, overcome by violent anger with myself for not accepting your will and entering into 
your convenant', vm, 8, p. 171. 
7 
vm, 7, p. 169. 8 
vm, 11, p. 175. 
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choose to act from one of his (first-order) desires.1 He can only influence his 
decisions indirectly by seeking to promote and strengthen the desire he 
favours. 
But all of these efforts and stratagems together are insufficient to turn the 
tide. Although the strength of the old attachments is gradually diminishing,2 
Augustine still cannot free himself from them. He is unable to resist the old 
habits, themselves backed by his (second-order) desire to hang on to them. 
'They plucked at my garment of flesh and whispered, "Are you going to 
dismiss us? From this moment we shall never be with you again, for ever and 
ever".'3 Thus his role seems reduced to that of sideline supporter encour? 
aging the underdog in the contest that rages in the will. 
Yet even while emphasizing this inability in the will, Augustine tends to 
attribute his failure to choose God to his own indecisiveness, as if he only 
needed to make a greater effort, be more resolute, in order to achieve what 
he truly desires. 
And to reach this goal... 
no more was 
required than 
an act of will. But it must be 
a resolute and whole-hearted act of the will, not some lame wish which I kept turning 
over and over in my mind_4 
But this tendency to view the problem of the will as one of weakness of will 
is, I believe, inconsistent with the other involuntarist theme in that it implies 
that he is able to choose God but will not put forth the required effort. 
Augustine's use of the language of decision at this stage of his conversion is 
indeed in accord with the way he has described the process up to this point, 
namely as depending mightily on his will, but this pattern of thought now 
collides with the realization that he cannot accomplish his goal by his own 
efforts. 
Finally in the garden, the chaste beauty of Continence invites him 
' 
to 
cross over and to hesitate no more'. 'Why do you try to stand in your own 
strength and fail? Cast yourself upon God and have no fear'.5 Augustine 
sees finally that he cannot achieve his goal by his own striving. He must 
relinquish all his attempts to bring about the conversion of his will, and 
submit to God's initiative. And with this final realization, reinforced by 
reading the exhortation from Paul's epistle, 
' 
the light of confidence flooded 
into my heart',6 and he is able to will resolutely and wholeheartedly a life 
of devotion. 
1 ' 
My lower instincts, which had taken firm hold of me, were stronger than the higher, which were 
untried. And the closer I came to the moment which was to mark the great change in me, the more I 
shrank from it in horror', vm, u, p. 175. 2 
See vm, 1, p. 158 and 11, p. 175, where he refers to the 'worn and slender remnant of my chain'. 
'These voices, as I heard them, seemed less than half as loud as they had been before' (p. 176). 3 
vm, 11, pp. 175-6. 
4 
vm, 8, p. 171 ; 
' 
I tried again and came a little nearer to my goal, and then a little nearer still, so that 
I could almost reach out and grasp it. But I did not reach it. I could not reach out to it or grasp it, because 
I held back from the step by which I should die to death and become alive to life', vm, 11, p. 175. 5 
vm, 11, p. 176. 
6 
vm, 12, p. 178. 
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The Will as Liberum Arbitrium 
Let us now try to elicit more fully Augustine's conception of the will or acting 
self, and the role that he assigns to his own initiative and activity in his 
conversion. In the following discussion, I will make use of two concepts of the 
will distinguished by Hannah Arendt in her chapter on Augustine in The Life 
of the Mind: Willing. The first is that of the will as 'a mere auxiliary executive 
organ for whatever either desire or reason has proposed'.1 The second is the 
will as liberum arbitrium, 
' 
the freedom of choice between two or more desirable 
objects or ways of conduct', both of which are 'equally possible and given 
to us, as it were, in statu nascendi as mere potentialities'.2 The will functions 
to realize one of these potentials. Our question, then, is how the will is 
functioning in Augustine's culminating act: does it opt for one of two 
alternatives? or does it merely execute the command of reason (reason's 
desire) when that desire finally becomes stronger than its rival? 
It is important to remember, at this point, that Augustine does employ the 
idea of the will as liberum arbitrium in the nearly contemporaneous work, De 
Libero Arbitrio, in which he asserts that men have freely chosen to turn away 
from God and so have brought upon themselves God's just punishment in 
the form of human corruption and suffering.3 This gives us some initial 
reason for thinking that Augustine's decisive act is the result of his exercising 
this same power of choice. On the other hand, even if Augustine allows that 
he has in some sense turned away from God, this is no guarantee that he can 
by his own power turn back to God.4 
But what makes the interpretation of the will as liberum arbitrium plausible 
is the fact that throughout the account of his conversion, as we have seen, 
Augustine assigns a significant role to his own individual effort and initiative. 
And indeed, it would be absurd to deny his active participation in the whole 
process, or to describe his progress in a way that ignored his own contribution 
to the outcome. The impress of Augustine's initiative is evident first and 
foremost in his intellectual struggle, as for example in his dialectical debate 
with the Manichees and the sceptics. But it is manifest also in various 
1 
Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2 : Willing (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978, 
1981), p 14. 
5 
Arendt, p. 29. 3 
These passages express this point clearly enough: 'We conclude, therefore, that the movement 
which, for the sake of pleasure, turns the will from the Creator to the creature belongs to the will itself. ' 
If the movement by which the will is turned this way and that were not voluntary and within our power, 
we could not be praised when we turn toward higher things, or blamed when, as if on a pivot, we turned 
toward lower ones_' On Free Choice of the Will, trans. A. S. Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff (Indianapolis : 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1964, 1979), Book Three, pp. 87-8. 
4 
Augustine states in Book Two of De Libero Arbitrio : 
' 
Since a man cannot rise of his own will as he 
fell by his own will, let us hold with firm faith the right hand of God, Jesus Christ our Lord, which is 
stretched out to us' (p. 84). But this is consistent with saying that human souls are blameworthy for not 
doing what they can (see Book Three xx, pp. 131-3) : 'He justly punishes them because they desire to 
remain in ignorance and difficulty, and because they are unwilling to arrive at truth and peace through 
zealously seeking and learning, and humbly confessing and praying' (p. 133). These are just the things 
that Augustine was able to contribute to his own conversion. 
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achievements along the way 
- in his realization that Scripture has authority, 
in his recognition that he was a slave to the old habits and needed to replace 
them with the new, in his turning inward to find the Light within, and finally 
in the various actions taken to foster and nourish the 
' 
great desire 
' 
that had 
come to life in him. Even the command of Continence to cast himself upon 
God is something to which he gives his acknowledgement and consent. 
But at the same time, we cannot ignore the strong element of passivity in 
Augustine's account. He speaks as if the transformation in his desires is 
something that happens to him, and that he is not himself controlling. One 
sees this of course in the stubborn resistance he finds in the will and in his 
inability to do what he wants to do. Moreover, the impression is given that, 
at crucial junctures when he has reached an impasse, it is only by the 
intervention of some external stimulus or agency that progress is made, as for 
example when Continence appears to him. 
This passive dimension of Augustine's experience is of course consistent 
with the idea that he himself is affecting the process and contributing to the 
outcome of his struggle in the aforementioned ways. And if it is allowed that 
Augustine can contribute in these ways, why cannot it be said that it is he 
who finally makes the difference, that is, tips the scales in favour of the new 
will? As the old will diminishes in strength, why can we not suppose that at 
some point it is weakened enough that he can decide against it? 
The chief difficulty about saying this is that while it is theoretically possible 
to view the act in this way 
- as an achievement of the liberum arbitrium, 
Augustine himself emphatically denies that it is. He refuses to give himself 
credit for an act which, he finally sees, is initiated from without. He sees this 
only at the very last moment with the realization that he should cease, or 
better, has ceased, his own striving.1 Thus he never has the ability, or acquires 
the ability, to turn toward God. And so, the culminating act is not his, not 
the result of his willing. 
But it would be a mistake to stop here, and to the extent that Augustine 
himself does, he fails to appreciate the significance of his own narrative. For 
it must be remembered that his conversion cannot be identified with the 
culminating decision but is rather a process, a series of acts that began with 
the questioning of the Manichean doctrines. And as we have just seen, 
Augustine did exercise his will heavily throughout this process. To the extent 
that the conversion process, considered as a whole, is a product of his effort 
and choosing, it is his accomplishment. The will functions merely as an 
executive organ with respect to the final decision, but since it initiates other 
deeds and pursuits in the larger process, it is strictly wrong to say or imply, 
as Augustine himself does*, that he does not function as agent in this process. 
1 
It could, of course, be maintained that Augustine finally becomes free at the moment of his final 
decision, viz. in the sense that he is now willing and living in accord with his greatest desire. Our concern, 
however, has been with whether he has any freedom of choice in reaching this final state. 
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It might be argued that the conversion is not his act because its final step 
is not his. But it can equally be said that the conversion is his act because the 
earlier steps of forming a clear vision of its object, and of the means or path 
to the object, and thereby making the initial moves in the right direction, 
were his. 
Finally, it cannot be argued, by a kind of backward projection, that all of 
these earlier acts were also things that he could not do alone, since there is 
no suggestion that he encountered any insurmountable resistance within the 
will with respect to any of them, and so was unable to do them. For instance, 
he challenges Faustus, and works his way toward a refutation of the Man? 
ichean doctrines. So even if Augustine does, after the fact, come to believe 
that God has somehow guided him toward his goal, this does not mean that 
his own decisions were not efficacious along the way. Clearly he depends on 
an outside force to bring about a shift in his desires and attitudes so that they 
conform to his vision of the truth. But I can find no basis in Augustine's text 
for saying that he is similarly dependent on God with respect to the series of 
actions by which he achieves that vision and thus brings himself to the 
moment of making the great decision. In this way, Augustine depicts the 
divine initiative as presupposing and conditioned by his own. 
Before closing this account of Augustine's conversion, we must mention some 
further confessions he makes about his post-conversion state. After the 
garden experience, Augustine's conversion is complete in the sense that he 
now wills resolutely a life of continence and devotion. The new will within 
him is stronger than the old. But the old will has not been eradicated. He 
continues to wrestle with the old tendencies, but now, like his friend and 
fellow convert Alypius, by way of a much more 'delicate conscience'. In 
Book X (as Peter Brown has emphasized), Augustine describes his ongoing 
struggle with sensory pleasures and bodily appetites 
- some of which have 
taken refuge in his dreams. The problem, as he sees it, is that he either 
overindulges these desires, or delights in sensory objects for their own sake 
rather than as manifestations of the source of all being. To the extent that 
he yields to these temptations, he suffers sorrow and anguish and is thwarted 
in his desire to know God completely. 'When at last I cling to you with all 
my being, for me there will be no more sorrow, no more toil. Then at last I 
shall be alive with true life, for my life will be wholly filled by you... but my 
life is not yet filled by you and I am a burden to myself'.1 
Albright College, 
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. 
1 
x, 28, p. 232. 
